By Lorenzo Monsante

1. Introduction

Peru is one of the three pillars of global mined copper supply along with Chile and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2025, the country produced around 2.7 million metric tons (Mt) of mined copper, or approximately 12% of global production, making it the third-largest producer in the world behind Chile (approx. 5.3 Mt) and the DRC (approx. 3.2 Mt), which overtook Peru as the world’s second-largest copper producer in 2023 (INN, 2026; World Population Review, 2026).

But if we look at only the volume of production, we do not have the complete picture of Peru’s role in the world market. Peru’s strategic importance for a physical trading desk is underpinned by a world-class asset base operated by a limited number of majors and trading houses with direct equity interests, export logistics highly concentrated on a few ports, a structural reliance on Chinese demand, both from state-linked smelters and from trading houses conducting blending, and heterogeneous concentrate quality — especially the arsenic problem at Las Bambas and Antamina — which can make blending necessary for certain concentrate parcels.

This article deals with the value chain of Peruvian copper. Specifically, it analyses who produces it, who buys the concentrate, which traders intermediate, where the material is sent for blending and smelting, and how Peru compares with its main competitors: Chile, DRC and Indonesia.

2. Peru in the world

2025 estimated mine production of contained copper:

  • Chile: ~5.3 Mt — world rank 1.
  • DRC: ~3.2 Mt — world rank 2.
  • Peru: ~2.7 Mt — world rank 3.
  • China: ~1.8 Mt — world rank 4.
  • USA: ~1.0 Mt — world rank 5.

Source: Statista (2025), INN (2026) and World Population Review (2026).

Peru’s production fell to 2.74 Mt in 2024, the first annual decline in four years of growth. In 2025, output was at a similar or slightly lower level, at around 2.6–2.7 Mt, partly due to isolated logistical disruptions. The most important were the community blockades along the southern mining corridor, which interrupted the transport of concentrate from Las Bambas during 2025 (Bloomberg, 2025; Discovery Alert, 2025).

Data for the first half of 2026 suggest production has held broadly steady at a similar run rate. If projects like Yanacocha Sulfuros, La Granja, Michiquillay and Tía María get the green light, national output could almost double to about 6 Mt, Peru’s Central Bank (BCRP) says, and Peru could reclaim its position as the world’s second-largest producer (UPI, 2025).

3. The Supply Side

Unlike Chile, where the state-owned company Codelco dominates production, Peru’s copper industry consists of a diverse group of private multinational companies, including pure-play mining firms, diversified conglomerates and, increasingly, Chinese investors.

Key mines and approximate 2024–25 output:

  • Cerro Verde: Freeport-McMoRan (53.6%), Buenaventura and SMM Cerro Verde — ~390–450 kt copper.
  • Antamina: BHP (33.75%), Glencore (33.75%), Teck (22.5%) and Mitsubishi (10%) — ~430–450 kt.
  • Southern Peru (Cuajone + Toquepala): Southern Copper Corp. / Grupo México — ~415 kt.
  • Las Bambas: MMG (62.5%, controlled by China Minmetals), Guoxin (22.5%) and CITIC Metal (15%) — ~300–350 kt.
  • Quellaveco: Anglo American (60%) and Mitsubishi (40%) — ~300 kt.
  • Constancia: Hudbay Minerals — ~90–100 kt.
  • Toromocho: Chinalco (Aluminum Corporation of China) — ~206 kt.
  • Antapaccay: Glencore — ~145–150 kt.
  • Marcobre (Mina Justa): Minsur (60%) and Alxar (40%) — variable output.

Source: Global Business Reports (2025), Teck (2025), Wikipedia/MMG (2023) and 10-K filings from Southern Copper Corporation and Freeport-McMoRan.

Two observations matter for a trading-oriented analysis.

First, ownership in Antamina translates into concentration of offtake. Antamina is not selling its concentrate on the spot market. Instead, each shareholder — Glencore, BHP, Teck and Mitsubishi — receives and markets its respective share of concentrate according to its percentage interest in the company through long-term offtake agreements entered into “on market terms” (Teck, 2025). Therefore, as both an owner/shareholder in Antamina and a commodities trader, Glencore has contractual control over roughly one third of all concentrate from Peru’s second-largest mine before it enters the open market.

Second, Chinese capital has significant upstream interests in addition to its role in trading. Las Bambas (MMG/China Minmetals) and Toromocho (Chinalco) produce more than 500 kt per year and are directly controlled by Chinese investors. Financing was provided by a bank syndicate led by China Development Bank and ICBC (The People’s Map of Global China, 2023). These investment structures create de facto captive flows of concentrates toward Chinese smelting capacity, regardless of the influence of independent traders.

4. Logistics and Main Hubs

Peru’s Andean geography forces district-specific logistics solutions.

Huarmey (Áncash) is the shipping port for Antamina. It has an exclusive slurry port facility that receives copper and zinc concentrate slurry through a 302-km pipeline. The slurry travels from Antamina Mine to the Pacific coast, where it is dewatered and held in storage until being loaded into ships (Teck, 2025).

Matarani Port (Arequipa) is a multipurpose logistics hub that handles copper concentrate from Las Bambas and Cerro Verde. Las Bambas transports its concentrate by truck from Apurímac through Cusco to the Pillones transfer station, from where it continues by rail to Matarani.

Ilo (Moquegua) is Peru’s main integrated copper-processing hub, connecting Southern Copper’s mines with its smelter, refinery and port facilities. Unlike other ports in Peru, Ilo processes a considerable amount of concentrate domestically all the way to cathode instead of exporting it as concentrate.

Callao (Lima Metropolitan Area) is a general-purpose port and the primary export site for companies producing smaller cargo quantities or for medium-sized producers.

Matarani’s role as the main export hub for Las Bambas underscores the vulnerability of Peru’s Southern Mining Corridor. Copper concentrate must first be trucked from the mine in Apurímac through Cusco to the Pillones transfer station in Arequipa, and then moved by rail to Matarani. A blockade along the road section can break the entire export chain. This happened in April 2025, when local community blockades forced Las Bambas to stop production for 15 days, affecting international concentrate flows as the mine produces nearly 2% of the world’s copper (Discovery Alert, 2025).

5. Buyers and Trading Firms

Peruvian concentrate travels through a chain of intermediation that combines integrated producer-traders such as Glencore, pure trading firms such as Trafigura, IXM and Mercuria, and final Asian buyers including Chinese, Japanese and Korean smelters.

The main physical traders active in Peru include:

  • Glencore plc, the country’s most integrated player. It has a 33.75% stake in Antamina, owns Antapaccay outright and buys concentrates from other producers. Its recent purchase of the Quechua project from Pan Pacific Copper further consolidates its position around Antapaccay and the future Coroccohuayco project (MINING.com, 2025).
  • Trafigura Group, one of the biggest buyers of copper concentrate from Las Bambas (Bloomberg, 2025).
  • IXM SA, formerly Trafigura’s metals trading division and now owned by China Molybdenum, which is another purchaser of Las Bambas concentrate (Bloomberg, 2025).
  • Mercuria Energy Group, which is also active in the South American concentrate market, although there is less information in the public domain about its activities in Peru than for Glencore and Trafigura.

The end buyers are mainly concentrated in a few destinations.

  • China is by far the main destination for Peruvian copper concentrate. Chile and Peru combined account for roughly 56% of China’s concentrate imports, with Peru typically the second-largest supplier after Chile (Discovery Alert, 2025). Annual TC/RC negotiations are also carried out by major Chinese custom smelters such as Jiangxi Copper, Tongling Nonferrous and China Copper. Agreements between these smelters and large mining companies often set the standard for long-term contracts across the market.
  • Japan is the second-largest destination for Peruvian copper concentrate. Japanese smelting groups such as Pan Pacific Copper negotiate their own annual supply contracts. These negotiations can diverge from the Chinese benchmark, especially when concentrate supply is tight and smelters are under pressure to accept lower TCs/RCs.
  • Spain and South Korea are the next important destinations, with smaller but still significant volumes going to Germany and India. The US is not a major destination for Peruvian concentrate, although it does import other refined copper products from Peru.

6. The Arsenic Problem

One reason for the role of trading intermediaries in Peru is the quality of its copper concentrate. Some Peruvian mines, notably Las Bambas and to a lesser extent Antamina, produce concentrate with arsenic levels above China’s legal import limit of 0.5%. Fastmarkets reported that a number of shipments of high-arsenic Peruvian concentrate arrived in Chinese ports such as Dalian, Huangshi and Zhapu even though the material was above the limit (Fastmarkets, 2016).

This has produced a hybrid business in China. Traders buy “dirty” concentrate with high arsenic at a discount and mix it with cleaner material from Chile, Australia or other mines in Peru. The final blend then meets Chinese import requirements and can be sold for a higher price. This is a good example of physical trading: buying discounted material, improving the specifications through blending and selling it on at a margin. It also shows why companies such as Glencore, Trafigura and IXM have invested in storage and blending facilities at Chinese ports.

Southern Copper follows a different model. Rather than selling concentrate, it sends material from its mines to its own smelter and refinery in Ilo, where it converts it into LME-grade copper cathodes for export. This means the company is not dependent on blending and is less affected by movements in TC/RCs. However, it bears the high costs of operating and upgrading its facilities and must comply with Peru’s environmental rules on arsenic and SO2 emissions.

7. The 2025–2026 TC/RC Market

Concentrate trade must be analysed against a significant shift in the treatment and refining charges (TC/RC) that miners pay smelters to process concentrate into refined copper. Generally, TC/RCs decline during periods of low concentrate supply and increase when concentrate availability is high.

During 2025/2026, however, the market reached extremes. In 2026, Antofagasta and Jiangxi Copper set an annual benchmark at $0/tonne, the lowest recorded, while in June 2026 spot charges fell to -$126.80/tonne. With negative TC/RCs, smelters are essentially paying miners to purchase concentrate, reversing the normal business model (Crux Investor, 2026; Mysteel, 2026).

This shortage of copper concentrate, caused by Chinese smelting capacity expanding faster than global mine supply, has several implications for Peru:

  • More bargaining power for Peruvian miners. Scarce concentrate allows producers to negotiate better terms in their offtake agreements. It also makes brownfield expansions such as Cerro Verde and Antamina, and new projects such as Zafranal, Tía María and Michiquillay, more attractive.
  • Lower margins for Chinese smelters. Smelters can partly compensate for low or negative TC/RCs through revenues from by-products such as sulfuric acid, gold and silver. This is particularly relevant for polymetallic mines such as Antamina (Fastmarkets, 2026).
  • Greater incentives for blending. When TC/RCs are negative, concentrate becomes more valuable. Traders can therefore generate attractive margins by purchasing lower-quality material and blending it until it meets import and processing requirements.
  • More interest in Peruvian copper assets. Major companies have stronger incentives to secure future production through acquisitions. Glencore’s purchase of the Quechua project, for example, is part of its plan to nearly double copper output while benefiting from its proximity to Antapaccay and the existing infrastructure in the area (MINING.com, 2025).

8. Peru and Other Major Copper-Producing Countries

Peru produces around 2.7 Mt. Ownership is private and fragmented across companies including Freeport-McMoRan, Glencore, Grupo México, MMG, Anglo American, Hudbay and Chinalco. Domestic smelting/refining integration is partial, mainly through Southern Copper at Ilo. The main commercial risk is social and logistical conflict in mining corridors.

Chile produces around 5.3 Mt. Ownership is mixed, combining state-owned Codelco with private players such as BHP and Antofagasta. It has significant smelting capacity but remains a major concentrate exporter. Key commercial risks include water scarcity and declining ore grades.

DRC produces around 3.2 Mt. Ownership is shaped by Chinese-Congolese joint ventures involving Gécamines and Chinese capital. Domestic processing is substantial, particularly into copper cathode. Main risks include country risk, governance and infrastructure.

Indonesia produces around 0.7 Mt. The sector is state-controlled through MIND ID (51.2%), with Freeport-McMoRan holding 48.8%. Domestic smelting integration is high, including Freeport’s Manyar smelter. The main commercial risk is downstream policy and raw-ore export restrictions.

Sources: USGS (2026) for estimated mine production; national mining authorities, EITI reports and company disclosures.

Peru has a much lower level of domestic processing than Chile because most Peruvian mines export copper concentrate rather than cathodes. This leaves the country more dependent on international traders and foreign smelters, particularly in China. Compared with the DRC, Peru has better-established transport and port infrastructure as well as lower governance risk. However, both countries have seen increasing Chinese ownership of major mining assets.

Peru also differs from Indonesia because it does not require mining companies to process their concentrate domestically before exporting it. This makes the Peruvian market more accessible to international traders, although the introduction of a similar policy in the future remains a possible political risk.

9. Risks and Outlook

  • Social conflict and transport disruptions. The Southern Mining Corridor remains one of the main risks to Peru’s copper industry. Blockades affected Las Bambas in both 2022 and 2025, disrupting exports to China and contributing to changes in regional spot TC/RCs (Bloomberg, 2025; Discovery Alert, 2025).
  • New mining projects. Yanacocha Sulfuros, La Granja, Michiquillay and Tía María are among Peru’s main potential sources of future production growth. Their development will depend on obtaining permits, securing investment and managing local opposition (UPI, 2025).
  • Negative TC/RCs. As long as copper concentrate remains scarce, Peruvian miners should continue to secure favourable terms in their offtake agreements. At the same time, competition among international companies to acquire or invest in Peruvian copper assets is likely to increase.
  • Dependence on Chinese buyers. China’s importance as a destination for Peruvian concentrate is reinforced by Chinese ownership of major mines such as Las Bambas and Toromocho. This creates a long-term need to diversify exports toward markets such as Japan, South Korea and Europe, particularly as trade tensions over critical minerals continue to grow.

10. Conclusion

The Peruvian copper market is influenced not only by mining, but also by physical trading. Differences in concentrate quality, vulnerability in the transport system and the pull from Chinese smelters create significant space for trading activity. Glencore, Trafigura and IXM are therefore as important to Peru’s copper flow as mining companies. Glencore in particular is a key player because it is both a shareholder in mines and an active buyer of concentrate.

With TC/RCs at historic lows and even negative figures, Peruvian concentrates have gained increasing importance. This is already visible in recent M&A activity, such as Glencore’s acquisition of the Quechua project, as well as renewed interest in underdeveloped copper reserves.

The main challenge for Peru’s copper flow is therefore not the supply of resources, but governance issues. Peru must reduce social conflicts in its main transport corridors and decide whether it wants to develop domestic smelting and refining capacity or continue to export most of its copper as concentrate to Asia.